# Department of State CP – UTNIF 22

## 1NCs

### 1NC – DoS CP - Generic

#### The Department of State should increase security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over [insert plan mechanism].

#### The counterplan competes and avoids the DoD disad – security assistance pulls from the state department’s budget

Epstein and Rosen 18 (Susan B. Epstein, Specialist in Foreign Policy. Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics,“U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends” Congressional Research Service,” Congressional Research Service, Feb. 1, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov R45091, WC)

U.S. security sector assistance to foreign countries is funded primarily in the foreign affairs and defense budgets. As the 115th Congress considers its spending priorities for the coming fiscal year, the magnitude, trends, and uses of such assistance may be examined and debated. The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations; the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA); and the Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations all contain provisions that could affect security assistance funding in FY2018 and beyond. While the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are the primary actors in the provision of such assistance to foreign countries—and the primary focus of this CRS report―other U.S. agencies may also conduct related programs, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and the Treasury; and parts of the intelligence community.

With the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) and later the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA, P.L. 90-629), as amended, Congress established the foundational authorities for contemporary U.S. security assistance programs. These authorities charged the Secretary of State with responsibility to provide “continuous supervision and general direction” of foreign assistance and contained specific reference to “military assistance, including military education and training,” to ensure its coherence with foreign policy. Over time, the Secretary of State’s security assistance authorities expanded to include international narcotics control, peacekeeping operations, antiterrorism assistance, and nonproliferation and export control assistance. The State Department’s authorities were codified in Title 22 of the U.S. Code (Foreign Relations and Intercourse), and funds for such assistance programs are largely appropriated through State Department accounts. Such assistance to foreign governments, security forces, and militaries covers a wide spectrum of activities, including the transfer of conventional arms, training and equipping regular and irregular forces for combat, law enforcement training, defense institution reform, humanitarian assistance, and engagement and educational activities. These activities may serve multiple purposes for both the United States and the recipient country.

DOD has long played a crucial role in the implementation of Title 22 security assistance programs and activities, but for many decades, it otherwise relegated the training, equipping, and assisting of foreign military forces as a secondary mission on its list of priorities, far below warfighting.1 Beginning in the 1980s, Congress began providing DOD with additional authority in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and annual NDAAs to conduct a range of programs and activities funded by DOD appropriations. Congress began providing such authorities in the 1980s for counternarcotics and humanitarian assistance; authority for nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs was subsequently added in the 1980s and 1990s.

In recent years, the international security environment, and the associated perceived threats to the United States homeland, has led DOD increasingly to give greater priority to building and strengthening security partnerships in a variety of contexts around the world. Particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has granted DOD new authorities in annual NDAAs and in Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code to engage in “security cooperation” with foreign militaries and other security forces—now considered by DOD to be an “important tool” for executing its national security responsibilities and “an integral element of the DOD mission.” 2 This trend underlies a significant expansion of DOD direct engagements with foreign security forces and an accompanying increase in DOD’s role in foreign policy decisionmaking. As the United States undertook military action and increased the scope of its foreign counterterrorism operations, Congress provided a number of DOD crisis and wartime authorities, some providing new global authority and some specific to certain geographic areas.3

In enacting these new authorities and appropriations, Congress has bolstered an expanding global DOD role in building foreign partner capacity through programs to train and equip foreign security forces, notably in the realms of counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and defense institution building. In addition, DOD is authorized to carry out various security cooperation and logistical support activities, as well as advise and assist missions that may have the added impact of boosting partner country capabilities. DOD’s security cooperation authorities were most recently and significantly modified in the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 114-328; signed December 23, 2016), which enacted several new provisions that modify the budgeting, execution, administration, and evaluation of DOD security cooperation programs and activities. Implementation of these provisions remains a work in progress.

The expansion of DOD’s engagement with foreign partner militaries over the past decade has both policy and budgetary implications. These include the overall size and scope of U.S. security assistance activities worldwide, the geographic distribution of such activities, and the relative influence of DOS and DOD in interagency security policymaking processes. Another implication relates to congressional committees of jurisdiction, as primary oversight and funding prerogatives have progressively extended and migrated from foreign relations to defense authorizers and appropriators. Yet, challenges continue to exist in the development of consistent interagency action and terminology to describe the range of security assistance and cooperation programs and activities funded by the U.S. government.

#### DOS-controlled security assistance solves

Bergmann and Schmitt 21- senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy AND\*\* senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, 3-9-21, Accessed Online at <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>, Accessed Online on 7-1-22)

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.

### 1NC – DoS CP- AI Aff

#### The Department of State should increase security assistance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over the use of artificial intelligence in military logistics and sustainment.

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## Competition

### AT PDB

#### The perm fails – ensures an uncoordinated bifurcated system that undermines deterrence and causes miscal

Bergmann and Schmitt 21 (Max Bergmann, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, focusing on European security and US-Russia relations. Alexandra Schmitt, Senior Policy Analyst, “It’s time to get the Pentagon out of the business of administering U.S. foreign aid,” Washington Post, March 11, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/11/its-time-get-pentagon-out-business-administering-us-foreign-aid/>, WC)

The result today is that the United States has two distinct security assistance systems — one at the State Department and one at the Defense Department — doing the same thing. That has created a bureaucratic mess involving countless planning and operational conflicts — one that also makes it impossible for Congress to conduct effective oversight, since the two departments answer to different committees. Recognizing the problem, some policymakers in Congress and the Pentagon have recently implemented a few useful reforms — but they go only so far.

Today, when combatant commanders show up in the countries they’re assigned to, they frequently have security assistance funding at their disposal. But State Department officials of similar rank often lack comparably flexible funding and yet have to deliver tough messages on other U.S. foreign policy priorities, from human rights to economic reform, democratization or even climate policy. This power imbalance is not lost on foreign partners, and they act accordingly, often tuning out the State Department while cultivating their relations with the Defense Department.

The current bifurcated system is not just wasteful — it’s also potentially dangerous. Policymakers originally expanded Defense Department assistance in response to the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism, when security assistance was often seen as a technical tool to smooth collaboration with foreign militaries. But in a new era of global great power competition, the provision of arms to another country sends a loud foreign policy signal, one that can easily lead to miscalculation. Those assistance decisions need to be well coordinated and calibrated by diplomats, not generals.

Fortunately, fixing this bureaucratic morass is straightforward: Just give the money to the State Department. Our new report argues that transferring the roughly $7 billion dollars in annual Defense Department security assistance funds that train and equip military partners to the State Department would restore the foreign aid system to its original conception as outlined in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The law put the secretary of state in charge of supervising all foreign assistance, including “military assistance” — exactly the programs that the Defense Department is now running on its own.

Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will give it renewed clout and minimize needless waste and bureaucratic confusion. Most importantly, it will reaffirm our commitment to a foreign policy based on democratic values and support for human rights.

#### The perm duplicates authority and undermines diplomacy – centralizing around DoS solves better

Bergmann and Schmitt 21 (Max Bergmann, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, focusing on European security and US-Russia relations. Alexandra Schmitt, Senior Policy Analyst, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” American Progress, MAR 9, 2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/,WC)

There are several challenges of this duplicative security assistance system at the DOD:

The DOD’s authorities duplicate authorities originally granted to the State Department. Congress originally granted long-term efforts to develop another country’s security forces to the State Department and put these efforts under the purview of diplomats. But in the post-9/11 security environment, rather than fix the State Department’s lack of resources to handle counterterrorism issues, appropriators gave the funds to the DOD, contributing to more bifurcation of security assistance policy. This was exemplified by the 2006 creation of Section 1206: a $350 million annual authority for the secretary of defense to support counterterrorism efforts and assist coalition partners. Though it required cooperation with the State Department, it was explicitly designed to empower the DOD, in part because some DOD officials thought the State Department was too slow and lacking expertise to carry out counterterrorism activities.37 In 2014, a Congressional Research Service report found that “government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for FMF, especially in the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds to meet legitimate foreign defense equipment needs.”38

Congressional barriers exacerbated the DOD-State Department imbalance. The 2011 Budget Control Act and a Republican-controlled Congress skeptical of the State Department made giving more resources to the department a nonstarter.39 Senior DOD officials urged Congress to grant the agency new authorities, such as in a 2008 House Armed Services Committee hearing with the secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.40 Faced with these constraints, the Obama administration opted to create more authorities at the DOD through the annual must-pass National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees, with jurisdiction only over the State Department’s security assistance programs, did little to correct the imbalance.41 According to one study before the recent consolidation efforts, the DOD managed 48 out of 50 new programs created after the 9/11 attacks.42 Of the 107 existing security assistance programs today, the DOD manages 87—a whopping 81 percent.43

DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46

Temporary programs become permanent. The majority of the new DOD security assistance authorities were premised as temporary, operational programs, designed to tackle immediate threats and challenges.47 But in practice, many programs have endured. Once a multiyear, multimillion-dollar program is established, it has a tendency to become entrenched, becoming a permanent assistance program with its own invested bureaucracy to sustain and expand it.48 The Section 1206 authority exemplifies this phenomenon: A 2017 DOD inspector general report found that “DoD officials stated that the temporary nature of the authority made it infeasible to commit the resources necessary to effectively manage Section 1206 as a ‘program’”—despite the fact that it was annually authorized and funded for 10 years until fiscal year 2015. Some $2.2 billion was appropriated for Section 1206 before it became law. Section 333 funding now replicates many of the same functions today.

The DOD’s duplicative security assistance programs complicate overall foreign policymaking. Reforming security assistance by centralizing resources at the State Department—and coupling the move with necessary reforms at the State Department—would go a long way toward improving this policy process.

### AT PDCP

#### Security cooperation requires the DoD – the state department can work independently

Johnson 17 (Charles Michael Johnson Jr., “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” Government Accountability Office, March 24, 2017, <https://dair.nps.edu/handle/123456789/3518>, WC)

DOD and State Roles in Security Cooperation and Security Assistance Efforts

DOD has the primary role in managing and executing a majority of security cooperation efforts authorized under Title 10 of the U.S. Code and various public laws. DOD defines security cooperation as activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. [Security cooperation] includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.17State has the primary role in managing and executing a majority of security assistance efforts authorized under Title 22 of the U.S. Code and various public laws. DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) also administers some of State’s security assistance efforts. According to State officials, State does not have a formal, documented definition of security assistance and instead refers to the Foreign Assistance Act for a working commonly understood definition.18 However, DOD has defined security assistance as a group of programs authorized by Title 22, U.S. Code, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The Department of Defense does not administer all security assistance programs. Those security assistance programs that are administered by the Department are a subset of security cooperation.19

In addition, some legal authorities are provided directly to the President who, in turn, delegates agency roles through executive orders to one or both of these agencies or to other agencies. For each effort, the agency authorized to oversee or manage the program may be legally required to consult with, or obtain concurrence from, another agency or to conduct some other form of collaboration, depending on the requirements stated in the authorities and accompanying executive orders supporting the effort and the particular activities being undertaken.

#### Security cooperation requires the DoD

Quinn ’19 [Major Jason A. Quinn; 2019; Judge Advocate in the United States Army; the Military Law Review, “Other Security Forces Too: Traditional Combatant Commander Activities Between U.S. Special Operations Forces and Foreign Non-Military Forces,” vol. 227]

Under this definition, “security sector assistance” includes the relevant policies, programs, or activities of any executive agency. Complicating matters, though, Congress has considered a proposed definition for “security sector assistance” that, in contrast to the presidential policy definition,130 encompasses DoS programs, but not DoD or other executive agency programs.131 **In addition, Congress has defined “security cooperation” as DoD specific**,132 but it has not defined “security assistance.” The DoD adheres to the presidential policy definition and further defines “security cooperation” as all its relationship building and foreign partner development activities, including “security assistance,” **which the DoD defines as a subset of security cooperation that is funded and authorized by the DoS** and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.133 The DoS, on the other hand, uses the term “security assistance” in a manner that contradicts the DoD's definition, employing it to describe any DoS or DoD assistance to foreign military or other security forces.134

#### The counterplan competes – “security cooperation” is exclusively DoD funding and “security assistance” is the DoS

Kerr 18 (Alexandra Kerr, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. context,” Connections, Summer-Fall 2018, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 23-38, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26934688>, WC)

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance).

DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation”activity.21 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.22 Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

#### The counterplan competes – security cooperation exclusively uses DoD funding and resources

Serafino 16 (Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense,” Congressional Research Service, May 26, 2016, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf>, WC)

The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation.” Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance.

There is no State Department definition for security assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance.” These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio.

DOD formally defines security assistance as the group of State Department 1961 FAA and AECA programs that a DOD organization, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), administers. These include programs conducted under two of the State Department international security assistance accounts and attendant authorities, as well as programs conducted under four related 1961 FAA and AECA authorities.

DOD uses the overarching term “security cooperation” to denote the State Department security assistance administered by DSCA through which the U.S. government furnishes defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, as well as all other DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments. The purposes of the interactions with foreign defense establishments defined as security cooperation are to “build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multilateral operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”8

### AT CP links to DoD

#### The counterplan avoids the net benefit – security cooperation exclusively uses DoD funding and resources

Serafino 16 (Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, “Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense,” Congressional Research Service, May 26, 2016, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf>, WC)

The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation.” Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance.

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#### Security Cooperation is exclusively funded by the Department of Defense, and Security Assistance is exclusively Department of State funding.

White 14 (Taylor White, Major, USMC, a Joint Doctrine Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7, “Security Cooperation How It All Fits” Joint Forces Quarterly, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72\_106-108\_White.pdf?ver=2014-03-13-152407-220)

Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities support or are combined with other assistance programs and often are a part of nation assistance. This often occurs in a manner that may appear confusing or convoluted to the joint warfighter. This article portrays how the programs and activities converge. Although the various terms and activities in show in the accompanying figure appear to have simple names and meanings, they in fact have strict definitions based on funding and authorities. While some of the activities directly support one another, others have distinct boundaries between their definitions and functions. The joint community is beginning to address the framework of security cooperation in a new joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (JP) 3-XX, *Security Cooperation*. It is important to embark with clear definitions and understanding of the complex relationship among these terms to facilitate understanding by the joint force.

Security cooperation is referred to in both joint professional military education programs and joint staffs as a tool to be employed by combatant commands. However, in other settings, it is a set of programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Extensive review of joint doctrine and policy reveals that the definition of *security cooperation* appears to encompass these areas and more. After expanding our understanding of security cooperation, other terms such as *security force assistance, foreign internal defense,* and security assistance provide additional specificity for the tasks being conducted, yet some of these actions fall outside security cooperation. Even though security cooperation spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it is not all-encompassing of security related support from U.S. agencies other than DOD.

Nation assistance is support rendered by foreign forces within another nation’s territory based on mutual agreements.1 While this term is used to describe the comprehensive approach to assisting other nations, the definition associated with nation assistance has two limitations: it does not encompass support to regional organizations, and it is only assistance by foreign forces. A better, broader term is *foreign assistance*, which is assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters.2 When examining the current definitions for *foreign assistance* and *nation assistance*, we find significant overlap:

Foreign assistance to foreign nations [ranges] from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. U.S. foreign assistance takes three forms: development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.3

This term is likely to resonate with the State Department, which has an Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance and a designated foreign assistance budget.

Nation assistance—assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.4

The term nation assistance is not often used in policy or strategy. For example, the current National Security Strategy mentions foreign assistance three times but does not use the term nation assistance. The first opportunity to create some clarity is to replace the term nation assistance with foreign assistance in the upcoming revisions of JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

If foreign assistance were to replace nation assistance in joint doctrine, the definition would include that portion of security cooperation that falls outside the realm of nation assistance in figure 1. Foreign assistance then encompasses all of security cooperation and reduces some of the ambiguity. Security cooperation then focuses strictly on the DOD contribution to foreign assistance and encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build both national and regional defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.5

Having addressed the larger constructs, it is possible to review and clarify the relationships between other programs and activities that occur within them. First is security assistance with a specific definition in relation to both DOD and State. It refers to a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. These programs are funded and authorized by State to be administered by DOD through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.6 This is the process by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services. That portion of security assistance outside of security cooperation in figure 1 reflects State and other civilian agency involvement.

#### The counterplan does not pull from Taiwan funding – the source is explicitly outlined

Mehta 21 (Aaron Mehta, Senior Pentagon Correspondent and Associate Editor for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Defense Department,“A radical plan calls for shifting billions to State from Defense,” Defense News, March 9, 2021, <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2021/03/09/a-radical-plan-calls-for-shifting-billions-to-state-from-defense/>, WC)

The shifting of funds would come from two pots of money within the defense budget.

The first would come from the relatively-new Section 333 train and equip authority, which the authors argue is duplicative of State’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program — an overlap that’s privately been echoed by state officials since Section 333 was created.

The second would come from the Pentagon’s long-term development funds, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund. Those dollars are recurring streams designed to help those specific countries build up their indigenous capabilities.

## Solvency

### 2NC – Solves NATO Cooperation

#### Security assistance facilitates continued cooperation

Bergmann and Schmitt 21- senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy AND\*\* senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, 3-9-21, Accessed Online at <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/>, Accessed Online on 7-1-22)

Moreover, countries that receive U.S. military systems are not just buying equipment off the shelf; they are entering into a longer-term relationship with that country for training, maintenance, and sustainment. This is similar to when a consumer buys a smart phone, as they are not simply buying a piece of hardware; they are reliant on the company to access its broader ecosystem of apps and software and trusting the company to safeguard important data. Over time, a consumer becomes locked in and dependent on a particular provider. Similarly, when a state commits to expanding military-to-military ties—often the most sensitive area for a country—they are making a diplomatic bet on that country. As they base their military on U.S. equipment and U.S. training and engagement, they similarly become locked in to the United States. This sets the ground for more productive American partnerships to tackle a range of geopolitical challenges. For example, U.S. security assistance has been key to building ties with Vietnam after the war between the two countries. American assistance provided to clear unexploded ordnance has helped repair diplomatic relations between Hanoi and Washington, while the recent provision of a retired Coast Guard ship to the Vietnam military can help strengthen military ties and potentially open the door to more U.S. assistance and security cooperation, which will further strengthen bilateral relations.

#### DOS security assistance deters adversaries and creates cooperation

Tankel and Ross 20- associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security AND\*\* non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for security cooperation, and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (Stephen and Tommy, “RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” 10-28-20, Accessed Online at <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition/>, Accessed Online on 7-1-22)

One of America’s most important foreign policy tools is not fit for purpose. U.S. security sector assistance — the means by which the United States strengthens alliances and partners — is stuck in the past. Crucially, it is out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners. Despite widespread agreement on the need to prioritize strategic competition with Russia and China, the United States still directs a disproportionate amount of assistance toward the Middle East. An emphasis on counter-terrorism since 9/11 has also contributed to an emphasis on building the wrong capabilities. The United States is not equipping allies and partners with the capabilities they need to deal with competitors who are adopting increasingly sophisticated strategies in the areas of cyber security, strategic communications, and illicit commercial activity. Moreover, the mechanisms needed to integrate security sector competition with other instruments of national power, including diplomacy, military operations, strategic communications, and other foreign assistance, are underdeveloped at best. These shortcomings hinder U.S. allies and partners, in turn leaving them vulnerable to Chinese and Russian influence. Assistance could and should be a critical tool for deterring competitors and enabling, influencing, and reassuring frontline allies and partners. Making it so will require the United States to change how it envisions, prioritizes, plans, and executes security sector assistance, and that it become more adept at using assistance for signaling purposes. This in turn will necessitate that the executive and legislative branches work together to expand the resources for security assistance or to slay the sacred cows that account for the misuse of the resources currently available. In taking these steps, the U.S. government should ensure that assistance is delivered in a way that reinforces, rather than neglects, its fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights, for ignoring these values cedes valuable ground to America’s competitors. Signs of a Gradual Shift The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define [Foreign Military Sales](https://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-sales-fms) as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items. Over the last several years, the national security enterprise has, with a great many fits and starts, endeavored to shift its broader focus — from weapons systems to diplomacy — away from counter-terrorism and toward strategic competition with state actors. As part of this shift, policymakers have attempted to realign security assistance to contribute more directly to strategic competition, primarily by creating new resources for security assistance in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The [European Deterrence Initiative](https://www.eucom.mil/document/39921/fy-2020-european-deterrence-initiative-fact-s), launched in 2014, has allocated around $6 billion annually to enhance America’s deterrent posture vis-à-vis Russia. It has been supplemented by the [Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative](https://securityassistance.org/content/%22ukraine%20security%20assistance%20initiative%22), authorized by Congress in Fiscal Year 2016 to provide $250 million in security assistance to bolster Ukraine’s security. Congress also created the [Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative](https://www.defensenews.com/home/2015/05/30/carter-announces-425m-in-pacific-partnership-funding/) in 2014, later re-designated as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, and funded it as a five-year, $425 million security assistance effort, which it has since extended through FY2025. This program is intended to improve the ability of Southeast and East Asian nations to address growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. In the FY2021 defense bill currently being finalized, Congress is set to authorize a [Pacific Deterrence Initiative](https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/the-pacific-deterrence-initiative-peace-through-strength-in-the-indo-pacific/), modeled on the European Deterrence Initiative, with as much as [$6 billion annually](https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/06/11/senate-panel-oks-6-billion-military-fund-to-confront-china/) to improve U.S. posture in the Asia-Pacific region, reportedly with a significant security assistance component. These efforts have been laudable, but far from sufficient. The European Deterrence Initiative has largely been used to [shift enduring costs](https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688849.pdf) for U.S. military presence in Europe into the Overseas Contingency Operations portion of the defense budget. It has also dedicated the vast majority of funds to posture and equipment pre-positioning, with little attention to security assistance beyond combined exercises — a significant missed opportunity. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative has been managed insularly by the U.S. Europe Command, which has bypassed synchronization with other Defense Department and U.S. government stakeholders, leading to a [focus](https://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/washington-security-assistance-kyiv-improving-long-term-returns-military-investments-ukraine) on the provision of “training and equipment at the expense of developing a long-term strategic vision and implementation of meaningful defense reform.” In the Asia-Pacific, the Maritime Security Initiative has shown promise, but its relatively limited funding has failed to significantly contribute to a rebalance of assistance toward the region, and it has largely funded projects with little deterrent value. Incoming U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Philip Davidson [declared](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/world/asia/south-china-sea-navy.html), “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.” Moreover, none of these initiatives have prioritized partner security sector governance — a vital element of any strategy that seeks to shape the behavior of U.S. allies and partners. As Congress considers the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, it is essential that these mistakes — failure to integrate security assistance with other instruments of national power, overemphasis on posture at the expense of cooperation, and too little ambition for assistance initiatives — are not repeated. Even avoiding them, however, will go only so far in terms of optimizing security sector assistance for the challenges ahead. The U.S. government should also address broader challenges with the way security sector assistance is prioritized and executed.

### 2NC - Solves Cyber

#### Increased resources solves cybersecurity

Tankel and Ross 20- associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security AND\*\* non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for security cooperation, and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (Stephen and Tommy, “RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” 10-28-20, Accessed Online at <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition/>, Accessed Online on 7-1-22)

The State Department has a wider mandate for security assistance, encompassing both military aid and assistance for civilians. It is also supposed to use security assistance to advance broader, more long-term objectives like trade and investment, efforts to help allies and partners develop an innovation base, and major diplomatic initiatives. To fulfill this mission, the State Department should develop a planning process that elevates common interagency objectives for assistance, deconflicts competing objectives where necessary, identifies security assistance resources projected to be available for the period of time necessary to achieve such objectives, and recommends the allocation of assistance based on U.S. foreign policy priorities. Those priorities should be derived from the next administration’s national security strategy and informed by the availability of resources, and regional and country-specific assumptions. State also needs to create a framework to guide the use of assistance as dictated by the above planning process in alignment with other instruments of national power, and a framework for factoring in how arms sales — both Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales — might affect U.S. security assistance planning and broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. Last year, the House of Representatives passed a State Authorization Act that required these and other reforms, but it has languished in the Senate since then. Defense Department assistance should focus narrowly on four inherently military objectives: supporting State Department-coordinated efforts to build long-term capacity so that an ally or partner can manage its own security challenges; achieving a fundamental improvement in U.S. posture to prevail (including via coalitions) in a potential contingency, for example by assisting a partner to build a deep-water port or develop the capability to contribute in a specific role to potential coalition operations; generating short-term capacity when deemed necessary to achieve strategic objectives or improving interoperability for a specific goal; and responding to real-time developments, such as deterrent signaling, personnel recovery, or humanitarian response. Defense Department planners should be required to identify the objective(s) they’re serving and justify their plans on that basis. They also should be conducting a rigorous analysis to identify gaps in Pentagon plans for contingency scenarios involving near-peer competitors or other real-time developments that could impact U.S. interests, and basing priorities for security assistance on those gaps. Stronger links between contingency planning and security cooperation will help focus Defense Department security assistance and advance strategic competition. Second, a more sophisticated and coordinated planning process should lead the United States to redirect security assistance to U.S. allies and partners in Asia and Eastern Europe, and expand the nature of assistance provided. The U.S. government has begun shifting some assistance, such as Section 333 capacity building administered by the Pentagon, away from U.S. Central Command countries to countries in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command regions. The State and Defense departments need to accelerate this shift to compete more effectively with Russia and China. The United States should be using Foreign Military Financing, as well as Maritime Security Initiative funding and other programs, to help regional states in Asia develop anti-access/area denial systems to challenge Chinese power-projection operations. The departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security should also be coordinating to increase support for U.S. Coast Guard cooperation with allies and partners to challenge China’s white hull strategy. Realizing a significant reallocation of security assistance in support of strategic competition will require increasing the overall budget for Foreign Military Financing. These budgets have declined from a peak of $9.4 billion in FY2015 to the current year’s $7.5 billion, while the importance placed on security cooperation with allies and partners and the variety of threats they face have increased. The amount of such an increase will depend on the needs of key allies and partners, and whether Congress is willing to reduce Foreign Military Financing to Israel and Egypt, which in some years accounts for nearly two-thirds of the program’s budget. Unquestionably, the State Department can improve its prioritization of the remaining amount, which is spread across more than 100 partners globally, but those limited resources go only so far. In our experience, selling Congress on an injection of resources or on reductions to Israel and Egypt will require considerable effort. The State Department would need not only to provide a compelling strategy for how resources that can be freed up by reducing commitments to Israel and Egypt will be used to improve America’s national security posture. It also will need to provide a convincing assessment that such reductions will not infringe on Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region or lead to a breakdown in the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt. We believe these crucial U.S. interests — Israel’s security and regional stability — can be maintained at lower aid levels. However, we are also realistic about the political challenges that make such a shift so difficult regardless of what any policy analysis suggests. For this reason, although we typically would recommend starting with a reallocation of existing resources before increasing the overall budget, in this instance we recognize that directing more money to the problem might be the least-worst option. A compelling case can be made for new resources and authorities to expand the types of aid provided under Foreign Military Financing — including to address the gaps identified above, such as cyber security and law enforcement. The argument will be strongest if it is articulated within broader strategies for competing with China and Russia. In addition to Foreign Military Financing, there are a mix of other programs the United States could use to increase the capacity and capabilities of key Eastern European NATO allies. As Max Bergmann observed on these pages a few years ago, Congress is likely to be unwilling to provide much assistance funding through traditional grant methods, especially as Eastern European countries are wealthier than typical grant assistance recipients. This approach is deeply flawed: Many of Eastern Europe’s governments lack the economic wherewithal to engage in the types of military development necessary to compete with Russia. Moreover, the United States has clear and urgent goals in the region that should not be left dependent on the vicissitudes of partners’ budget politics. At the same time, we agree with Bergmann that the United States cannot and should not shoulder too much of the responsibility for these countries, which should demonstrate a commitment to acquisitions. One of the problems with Foreign Military Sales, though, is that U.S. weapons systems that Eastern European militaries would need to compete with Russia are top-of-the-line and likely unaffordable for midtier countries. Providing excess defense articles is one workaround, but this puts recipients at the mercy of what is available. Bergmann’s recommendation that the United States provide a mix of grants and loans to help NATO countries make acquisitions themselves is a fine one, and we would offer complementary or alternative approaches as well. The U.S. government could consider a lend-lease program in which equipment itself is provided via a loan or low-cost lease for a period of time to be used in an agreed-upon manner, after which the recipient could purchase the equipment at a reduced cost. Pooled sales and multilateral cooperative platforms modeled on the Movement Coordination Center Europe are other promising solutions. Any one of these models would be an improvement on the current approach. As China, Russia, and others compete across a range of domains stretching beyond traditional military strength — cyber security, law enforcement, and disinformation — the U.S. government should enhance its ability to provide timely, relevant assistance in these areas. In our experience in government, American allies and partners routinely ask for this assistance. Yet, U.S. capacity building in each of these areas is immature. Cyber security assistance is meagerly resourced and often ad hoc, with limited assistance programs spread incoherently across government agencies. Likewise, intelligence and law enforcement capacity building are limited and often plagued by turf battles. Enabling allies and partners to counter disinformation represents an emerging area of focus, and Washington should rise to the occasion. In many of these areas, effective governance is often one of the most crucial gaps America’s allies and partners confront. To meet these challenges, the United States should reimagine security sector assistance, factor in its impact on governance and rule of law, and increase the involvement of the departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury.

#### DoS is key to prevent cyberattacks

Kelley 22 – Alexandra Kelley – Alexandra Kelley reports on emerging technology for Nextgov – “State Department Announces First Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy” – April 4th, 2022 – <https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2022/04/state-department-announces-first-bureau-cyberspace-and-digital-policy/363982/>//daxw

The U.S. Department of State announced Monday the formation of its first Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, an office emphasizing the digital modernization in the federal sphere that is a key mission within the Biden administration. Some of the areas of focus include national security, economic developments and digital technologies, all within a policy lense. “The Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy leads and coordinates the Department’s work on cyberspace and digital diplomacy to encourage responsible state behavior in cyberspace and advance policies that protect the integrity and security of the infrastructure of the internet, serve U.S. interests, promote competitiveness and uphold democratic values,” the office’s website reads. A Senate-confirmed Ambassador-at-Large will helm the office, with Jennifer Bachus—previously the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Prague, Czech Republic—serving as its inaugural lead. The CDP will include three distinct policy offices, including International Cyberspace Security, International Information and Communications Policy, and Digital Freedom. In a statement, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the new office will usher in a new focus in U.S. foreign and domestic security by incorporating emerging technologies into policy decisions. “On **cyberspace and emerging technologies, we have a major stake in shaping the digital revolution** that’s happening around us and making sure that it serves our people, protects our interests, boosts our competitiveness and upholds our values,” Blinken said. “**We want to prevent cyber attacks that put our people, our networks, companies and critical infrastructure at risk.** We want the internet to remain a transformative force for learning, for connection, for economic growth, not a tool of repression. We want to shape the standards that govern new technology, so they ensure quality, protect consumer health and safety, facilitate trade, respect people’s rights.” Modernization is also a goal the office hopes to achieve. Blinken commented that the State Department will be asking for a 50% increase in its information technology budget and more sophisticated data strategy to build a robust technological environment within the agency. “A learning institution is a strong institution—open to new insights, new information, new ways of working,” Blinken said.

### 2NC – Solves AI

#### State Department has a comparative advantage in AI cooperation – solves best

Dukeman 20 (Ryan Dukeman, senior fellow at FP21 and a Ph.D. student at Princeton University, where he researches institutional reform in U.S. foreign policy agencies. He previously helped found the U.S. State Department’s Center for Analytics, “WINNING THE AI REVOLUTION FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMACY,” War on the Rocks, November 25, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/winning-the-ai-revolution-for-american-diplomacy/)

The State Department Should Lead on AI

Why is diplomacy — rather than defense or industrial policy — the right venue for advancing a digital democracy agenda, or something like it? Simply put, the multidimensional and transnational nature of AI requires an integrated, strategic approach, and diplomats are uniquely skilled in making policy across these issues more than the sum of their piecemeal parts. To channel former French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, AI is too important to be left to the generals — or the technologists — alone.

So far, most of the government’s focus on AI has been through research and development investments at the Defense Department, or through White House Office of Science and Technology Policy efforts to capitalize on it as an innovative economic windfall. Unfortunately, this approach — including leaving much of the intergovernmental norm-setting on AI to peer-to-peer military discussions — misses the strategic forest for the tactical trees. Issue-specific approaches that target global AI only as a military tool or an economic boon have two dangerous flaws: They largely ignore AI as a human rights issue, and forsake the potential for alliances and issue-linkage across policy areas. For example, existing efforts have failed to leverage U.S. technological leadership to advance global norms aligned with Western values, or to use foreign assistance to promote inclusive digital development at scale.

The State Department’s diplomats maintain a comparative advantage over interagency peers in remedying exactly these flaws. Diplomats are skilled in dealing with crosscutting global problems, and well suited to play a leading, orchestrating role in advancing a concerted American vision for AI across its economic, security, and human rights aspects. In Washington, at their posts, and in multilateral organizations, diplomats spend much of their days integrating peer agencies’ competing perspectives to advance a concerted U.S. agenda; leveraging instruments of national power such as foreign aid, military assistance, or visa regulations to advance disparate goals across different issues; and negotiating in bilateral and multilateral fora on economic, political, human rights, and military matters. The State Department’s sustained leadership in international organizations, which will play a major role in digital technology governance, is an additional underutilized advantage. The White House is wrong not to include the State Department as a “key agency” in its strategy on AI. In fact, the department may be the keystone agency — linking disparate, issue-specific efforts together so the result is more than the sum of its parts.

#### DoS is the key actor in emerging technology – fixing policy is an essential first step in solvency

Saeed 21 – Ferial Ara Saeed – Ferial Ara Saeed is CEO of Telegraph Strategies LLC, “A State Department For The Digital Age” – War on THE Rocks – June 20, 2021 – https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/a-state-department-for-the-digital-age///daxw

Carl Sagan was right. The renowned American scientist once warned that “we have arranged a society based on science and technology, in which nobody understands anything about science and technology.” A case in point: the State Department’s ongoing review of whether to keep cyber security and emerging technology policy in the hands of the undersecretary for arms control and international security, where former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put both portfolios in January 2021. It makes some sense for arms controllers to lead on security threats in cyberspace. Deterrence is an important element of cyber security, and those who work on arms control would be familiar with deterrence. But developing and executing emerging technology policy requires a different set of skills. AI, the Internet of Things, and 5G, to name only a few emerging technologies, hold vast economic, military, and political potential. Their impact goes far beyond security, the traditional focus of arms control. It is multidimensional and so policy approaches should be too. These technologies lie at the heart of Sino-American rivalry, U.S. innovation and economic leadership, and the future of the global order. They are driving tectonic shifts that will test American diplomacy in ways unseen since the Cold War. Congress agrees that a security-dominated approach to technology issues is insufficient. However, its proposals to improve Foggy Bottom’s policymaking apparatus do not go far enough. **The State Department could address both problems** — **where to put emerging technologies and how to fix technology policymaking overall** — by consolidating technology issues under a new undersecretary position. Doing so would ensure equal attention to economic, security, and political interests, improve coordination and integration of policy, and elevate the stature of cyber diplomacy and technology issues. This move would be consistent with the recommendations of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. Ultimately, consolidating technology policy at the State Department would also help to build the skills and expertise that the department needs to lead foreign policy in the digital age. Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Implications of Emerging Technologies Emerging technologies are redefining what it means to be prosperous, secure, and powerful. Every country wants to acquire them and use them to expand or project power and influence, causing friction among nations and provoking anxiety, jealousy, fear, and rage. To lead at this new frontier is to gain a geostrategic advantage for the next century. China is devoting massive resources to that race. Emerging technologies are effectively driving two big shifts: the technological revolution and the rise of China as a strategic competitor to the United States. But this is no rerun of the era of U.S.-Soviet rivalry. It is more complex. The unprecedented speed and scope of technological advances today are disrupting the pecking order within and among nations and hastening the decline of the existing global order. Cyberspace is now as critical an arena for diplomacy and conflict as the physical world. China, furthermore, is not the Soviet Union. The world’s second largest economy is an engine of global growth and has integrated into the international economic order while playing by its own rules. The U.S. and Chinese economies are also deeply interdependent, raising the costs of conflict and complacency. For all the foregoing reasons, competition with China should be a key consideration in deciding where to place emerging technology policy. This competition is not primarily a weapons race but a race for economic and technological supremacy, and a political contest between two dueling systems. State Department Responses to the Emerging Technology Challenge Until Pompeo established the bureau for cyberspace security and emerging technologies in January 2021, no single office or bureau was in charge of emerging technology policy at the State Department. The bureau has not been stood up, awaiting the outcome of an internal review. Pompeo sought to merge two offices with responsibilities for coordinating diplomatic responses to the security aspects of emerging technologies and effectively create a stronger, more unified, security voice. One office was already under the undersecretary for arms control and international security, the other was not. Pompeo’s predecessor, Rex Tillerson, took the opposite approach: He wanted to place the latter office under the undersecretary for economic affairs in 2017, part of his effort to eliminate special envoy positions, but critics argued that security issues would get short shrift. Pompeo’s arrangement has operated informally since 2018. He notified Congress of his intent to formalize it in June 2019. But then-House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Eliot Engel blocked the formation of the bureau because it would focus too narrowly on cyber security and fail to elevate economic and political interests. However, that was Pompeo’s point — to address “the security challenges presented by rapid developments in emerging technologies.” Emerging technology policy was thus not really a stand-alone effort after all, but an adjunct of cyberspace security. Two General Accountability Office investigations during Pompeo’s tenure confirmed that arms control specialists were focusing solely on security to the detriment of economic and political interests. While State Department officials maintained that coordination with other parts of the bureaucracy was taking place, and there is no reason to doubt that assertion, the General Accountability Office was unable to confirm it. Furthermore, in public statements at the time U.S. officials made clear that their focus was on security challenges. But emerging technology policy requires equal consideration of the economic and political challenges that these technologies present in the hands of competitors and adversaries. AI, for instance, could give autocrats greater capacity to manipulate public opinion, destabilize democracies, and monitor their citizens. It makes as much sense for arms control specialists to formulate and drive the required policy responses as it does to ask democracy experts to address the strategic stability questions raised by hypersonic missiles (another emerging technology). Economic interests fare no better. The last administration reached into its security policy toolkit to regulate “the availability of things” in response to China’s unfair practices in the technology race with United States, risking American innovation leadership and economic competitiveness. While some may argue that the administration was responding to the perceived loss of U.S. competitiveness resulting from China’s predatory trade practices, U.S. industry, at the center of the storm, certainly did not see it that way. American technology companies pushed back hard against the worst of these policies on the grounds that they would not only harm their interests but also the U.S. economy, and so undercut the very goals that the administration was trying to achieve. The strategic risks of a security-dominated approach are even broader. Restrictive U.S. policies and China’s responses to them also turned the dial of Sino-American relations decisively towards confrontation. A warier, more critical approach to Beijing is warranted, but Washington has to walk a fine line to keep the complicated mix of rivalry and mutual interests in the relationship from spilling over or prompting hedging by other states. A security-dominated approach to emerging technologies is simply too blunt and too narrow. Arms control specialists, with their focus on security, unquestionably have a critical role to play on such issues as seeking a global prohibition against AI-enabled systems deciding when to deploy nuclear weapons. But leading the State Department on emerging technology policy requires perspective on a diversity of vital U.S. interests that go well beyond security.

### 2NC – Solves Arms Sales

#### DoS oversee international arms sales – they solve best

US DoS 21 – U.S Department of State – U.S. Arms Sales and Defense Trade – January 21, 2021 – https://www.state.gov/u-s-arms-sales-and-defense-trade/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Department%20of%20State's,the%20Foreign%20Assistance%20Act%20of//daxw

The United States is committed to strengthening allies and partners worldwide to meet their sovereign self-defense needs and to improve their capabilities to operate with U.S. forces to address shared security challenges. The **U.S. Department of State’s** Bureau of Political-Military Affairs **oversees most government-to-government arms transfers and commercial export licensing of U.S.-origin defense equipment and technologies**, consistent with the Arms Export Control Act, the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 , the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and other statutory authorities and relevant international agreements. Arms sales and defense trade are tangible implements of foreign policy with potential long-term implications for regional security. For this reason, the United States takes into account political, military, economic, arms control, and human rights conditions in determining the provision of military equipment and the licensing of direct commercial sales to any country. Each proposed transfer we review is carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis, and approved if found to further U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. In addition, major defense transfers and sales may be subject to Congressional notification. Review and End Use Monitoring are integral components of the process for U.S.-origin defense equipment delivered to any recipient nation. The United States works to ensure U.S.-origin defense equipment is used consistent with the agreement or licenses under which the arms were transferred. The United States is committed to expediting, when possible, defense transfers to U.S. allies and partners, while at the same time seeking to control access to U.S.-origin defense technologies by hostile state and non-state actors. Before U.S.-origin defense articles and services are exported or transferred to foreign entities, those entities must agree to: 1) not retransfer equipment to third parties without first receiving written U.S. government authorization; 2) not dispose of or use the defense article for purposes other than those for which they were furnished without first receiving written U.S. government authorization; and; 3) maintain the security of any item with substantially the same degree of protection afforded by the U.S. government. Properly regulated defense transfers support the U.S. defense industrial base, promote interoperability, and reduce the costs of procurement for our own military. Up to 1 million people across our nation rely on U.S. defense exports for their jobs. These individuals and the companies they work for represent a key part of American entrepreneurship and innovation, as they help to maintain the United States as the world leader in the defense and aerospace sectors and ensure our armed forces sustain their military edge. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) Under FMS, the United States government manages approximately $55 billion per year in new sales of defense equipment to foreign allies and partners. The Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers in the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/RSAT) manages the FMS approval process, in close partnership with the Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) . DSCA coordinates implementation of FMS cases the military services negotiate with U.S. defense contractors. These sales provide the foreign allies and partners who are our customers with a complete defense capability that includes training, sustainment, and contractor logistics support. The FMS sales process begins when a country submits a formal Letter of Request (LOR). Ideally, this includes both a desired military capability, and a rough estimate of what the partner is able to spend. Sales are approved following U.S. government review and, when required, after Congressional notification. After the sale is approved, the DSCA issues a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) specifying the defense articles, training, and support being offered for delivery. Major FMS sales formally notified to Congress are publicly announced on the DSCA website . Processing times for FMS cases vary, but they may take months to define and approve, especially for major defense articles that may require modifications to standard U.S. configurations. Partners often do not take delivery of the full package until years after the LOA is finalized, which is primarily due to the time required to construct sophisticated defense systems such as fighter aircraft. DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES (DCS) Under DCS, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DDTC) provides regulatory approvals for approximately $115 billion per year in sales of defense equipment, services, and related manufacturing technologies controlled under the 21 categories of the U.S. Munitions List (USML) . These sales are negotiated privately between foreign end-users and U.S. companies. Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), any U.S. company or individual involved in certain activities involving defense articles described on the USML is required to register with DDTC. Further, a DDTC license or other approval is required before exporting a defense article (including ITAR-controlled technical data), or providing a defense service to a foreign end-user. As with FMS, export licenses approved under DCS are approved following an intensive U.S. government review, and after congressional notification, as required. Export licenses are valid up to four years. Authorizations for defense services may be for longer timeframes. They may be extended or amended as needed. DCS cases are considered to be proprietary agreements between the foreign governments or companies and U.S. defense contractors; however certain information about cases notified to Congress is published quarterly in the Federal Register , in fulfillment of requirements in the Arms Export Control Act. Aggregate data regarding approved export authorizations to governments is published annually to DDTC’s website, known as the “655 Report.” Dual-use items and some less sensitive military technologies are controlled by the Department of Commerce on the Commerce Control List (CCL) . Since 2013, the U.S. Government has transferred a significant number of items and technologies from the USML to the CCL to ease the burden on U.S industry as part of our ongoing regulatory reform efforts.

### 2NC – AT CP Fails

#### DoS staff still exceptional and self-reforming

Zeya and Finer 20 (Uzra S. Zeya, CEO and president of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, a network of more than 130 organizations working in over 180 countries to end conflict through peaceful means. Jon Finer, adjunct senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, No. 89, November 2020, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/csr89_final.pdf>, WC)

But this situation can be reversed. The State Department’s ranks are still among the most talented professional public servants anywhere in the government. When properly empowered and entrusted with significant responsibilities, American diplomats play essential roles in consequential outcomes for the country—from the Iran nuclear deal and Paris climate accord in the Barack Obama administration to the Afghanistan peace process and the release of American prisoners from various countries under President Trump. And its current predicament could make the State Department itself, which has long resisted fundamental reform, more open to badly needed changes. This report does not speak to every challenge the State Department faces but rather highlights the reform areas that we identified as reflecting greatest need based on discussions with veteran diplomats and other experts.

#### DoS solves – centralizing control of money ensures effective foreign assistance

Roberts 17 (James Roberts, Former Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth at Heritage, “America Needs a Stronger State Department, Not an ‘Independent’ Foreign Aid Agency,” Heritage, Nov 17, 2017, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/america-needs-stronger-state-department-not-independent-foreign-aid-agency)>

But foreign assistance is increasingly a core State Department function. Money is critical in influencing people and governments around the world to achieve America’s short- and medium- term national security objectives.

Those who trumpet USAID’s independence and oppose its merger with the State Department basically are arguing that the United States should have two State Departments—one with money and one largely without. That may fulfill the desires of bureaucrats building their fiefdoms or foreign aid contractors that prefer to deal with one independent federal agency, but such a solution ill serves the country.

Just as is the case overseas, where the U.S. ambassador is the senior-most official in an American embassy, in Washington the secretary of state should have undisputed authority over decisions about allocating U.S. foreign assistance. The State Department—highly competent, well-equipped, appropriately staffed and resourced—should include a foreign assistance component. That is what countries such as Canada, Denmark, and Sweden already have done.

# Aff Answers

### 2AC – PDB

#### Perm do both – coordination key to access high-demand experts – the counterplan alone fails to solve deterrence

Kreuttner et al. 18 (Col. Tim Kreuttner, U.S. Army; Lt. Col. Sami Alnaqbi, United Arab Emirates Navy; Lt. Col. Jarrod Knapp, U.S. Air Force; Maj. James Woodard, U.S. Marine Corps“A Joint and Operational Approach for Security Assistance to Georgia and Ukraine,” Military Review, March-April 2018, WC)

The U.S. and NATO’s ability to deliver training, education, and advice at the operational level will face challenges. Synchronization of operational maneuver and the ability to integrate joint capabilities in a coherent campaign is something that even the best militaries have to work hard at to do well. The requisite expertise to train partners in operational planning and execution is not plentiful and usually resides in combatant command or other major command staffs, with the majority not dedicated to training, exercises, or other security cooperation activities.

Subject-matter experts capable of leading training are low-density, high-demand assets whose own organizations are often reluctant to part with for “secondary” security cooperation tasks—namely planners, strategists, joint-fires-qualified experts, and other joint doctrine and technical experts. The United States needs to manage the joint and operational expertise closely to leverage the right expertise at the right time while not levying an undue burden on owning organizations. But, for partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia to progress, this is necessary.

Conclusion

Ukraine and Georgia are on the front lines of strategic competition. While the United States and NATO have provided robust tactical training and strategic development over the last twenty years, there is a gap in joint training and development at the operational level. The U.S. and NATO security assistance to these geopolitically key nations contributes to deterrence of Russia while improving the interoperability and capability of important partners. An integrated joint approach to security cooperation focusing at the operational level will strengthen Ukraine and Georgia and serve as an appropriate deterrent to Russian aggression. A joint approach to partnership programs would significantly enhance the defense capability and interoperability of Ukraine and Georgia to participate in NATO operations and exercises. Expanding combined, joint interoperability at the operational level should be the next critical focus of our partnerships.

### 2AC – PDCP

#### Perm do the counterplan – normal means security cooperation includes the state department

Anderson et al. 16 (R. Reed Anderson, Patrick J. Ellis, Antonio M. Paz, Kyle A. Reed, Lendy “Alamo” Renegar and John T. Vaughan *“STRATEGIC LANDPOWER AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO DETERRENCE*: Chapter 4 THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, May 1, 2016, pp. 117-142, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12082.11>, WC)

\*\*\*Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security\*\*\*

Although the United States TSC efforts are facilitating many of the military-focused assurance and deterrence tasks NATO has recently undertaken, there is room for improvement in gaining U.S. interagency support for conducting FID training. The goal for this type of FID would be to assist with strengthening the resilience of a NATO ally to ensure they are less vulnerable to Russian ambiguous actions. The challenge for conducting what might be thought of as “interagency FID” would be establishing priority countries, identifying focus areas, and getting the appropriate trainers in place. The key in every case is for the United States and allied or partner countries to jointly determine the lines of effort necessary to achieve specific and attainable objectives while considering NATO defense planning process priorities. The United States must be cognizant of the strategic end states for each Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and associated country specific **Security Cooperation** Sections, which should lay out the end states and the ways to achieve them, and should be coordinated with the U.S. Embassy Integrated Country Strategy and associated foreign assistance plans.

There are several challenges to employing an interagency FID effort to build resilience among NATO allies. First, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and EUCOM must ensure that the DoS Regional Strategies and EUCOM’s TCP are mutually supporting. There is no clear chain of command in this process, and it will certainly involve intense personal engagement from leaders across the interagency. The primary stakeholders, DoS and EUCOM, operate differently with respect to generating strategy. The presidentially appointed ambassadors are the lead for developing their country plans, which are then forwarded to the DoS in Washington for inclusion in the regional strategies. In the DoD, the policy offices of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) and EUCOM generate the strategy and then push it down to subordinate elements for execution. The common ground for decision-makers can be hard to determine since the Ambassador is the lead for DoS and is country focused and the EUCOM commander is the lead for DoD and is regionally focused. Achieving unity of effort toward building resilient partners will require a constant, integrated engagement from both bureaucracies. Additionally, it would be invaluable to generate some form of interagency resilience strategy that would synchronize efforts.23

### 2AC – CP links to NB

#### Perm shields the link and the CP links to DoD DA – their budgets are synchronized and DoD is essential to security assistance

Doubleday 17 (Justin Doubleday, managing editor of Inside the Pentagon until June 2021, where he focused on defense-wide topics including budgets, acquisition policy, combatant commands, missile defense and cyber, “DOD, State Department establish security assistance steering committee,” Inside the Pentagon , September 28, 2017, Vol. 33, No. 39, pp. 1, 10-11, WC)

The Pentagon and the State Department have set up a high-level group to help synchronize the two agencies’ control over billions of dollars’ worth of security assistance to foreign countries.

The Security Sector Assistance Steering Group was established this past spring by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, according to Todd Harvey, acting assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities. Harvey testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sept. 26.

The steering committee will help “oversee a collaborative planning process, identifying top national security priorities and synchronizing investments to maximize results,” according to Harvey’s written testimony.

One of the committee’s immediate priorities is to develop a process for fiscal year 2018 security sector assistance planning to “permit State and DOD to validate security assistance requirements for countries that directly support this administration’s top priorities,” according to Tina Kaidanow, acting assistant secretary of state for the bureau of political military affairs. Kaidanow and Harvey are co-chairs of the new steering committee.

The committee will also ensure DOD’s expanding security assistance programs match up with the State Department’s traditional lead role for that function, according to Kaidanow’s testimony. The State Department requested $5.1 billion for Foreign Military Financing in FY-18, with $3.1 billion earmarked for Israel and $1.3 billion planned for Egypt.

But Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Ben Cardin (D-MD) expressed concern over the growing security assistance role played by the Pentagon. DOD oversees several security assistance programs, including the $1.5 billion Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria fund and the $4.2 billion Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.

Cardin called such programs “necessary and important,” but worried about the control over security assistance shifting from the State Department to the Pentagon.

“My chief concern, however, is that DOD is setting up an essentially parallel security assistance structure without sufficient State Department oversight, input and coordination,” Cardin said. “Combine this with the current administration’s profoundly unwise proposal to slash the Department of State’s budget, opaque reorganization efforts and increasing loss of experienced personnel, and one could easily see us in a scenario in which the Department of Defense could become the dominant source of U.S. security assistance.”

Cardin pointed to section 333 of Title 10, which mandates the secretary of state concur with any train-and-equip program proposed by the Pentagon.

The new steering committee will “optimize section 333 military assistance and [Foreign Military Financing] resources to effectively advance national security objectives, leverage each Department’s expertise and authorities, and reinforce our respective requests to Congress,” according to Kaidanow’s testimony.

“In the longer term, the intent is to strategically integrate State and DOD planning and resourcing processes for a wider range of SSA resources, including by synchronizing budget requests and rationalizing and refining the use of SSA authorities,” her testimony added. -- Justin Doubleday

### 2AC - DoD key - AI

#### DoD action better than DoS – leaders have already allocated leadership to them

Horowitz and Kahn 22 (Michael C. Horowitz and Lauren Kahn – Professor on American foreign policy at John Hopkins – “Why DoD’s New Approach to Data and Artificial Intelligence Should Enhance National Defense” – March 11, 2022 – <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-dods-new-approach-data-and-artificial-intelligence-should-enhance-national-defense//daxw>)

The ability of the United States to compete in the 21st century depends on U.S. leadership in data and artificial intelligence (AI). In response, **the Department of Defense (DoD) is taking a new and much-needed approach to U.S. defense efforts in data and AI**. David Spirk, the departing Chief Data Officer of the Pentagon, made clear yesterday that the office of the Chief Digital and AI Officer (CDAO), in addition to its other functions, will be the successor organization for and replace DoD’s much-touted Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC). While the JAIC symbolized DoD’s efforts to get smart on AI beginning in 2018, the integration of data and AI represents a maturation of the U.S. AI approach—one that elevates the importance of AI in national defense. The JAIC itself was not as important as what the JAIC stood for—**DoD’s commitment to U.S. defense AI leadership**. In paving the way forward and getting AI on the agenda, the JAIC succeeded. From this point on, a more cohesive approach to AI and data through the CDAO is more likely to accelerate AI adoption throughout the U.S. military because it links DoD’s AI efforts with data, the fuel AI requires. For U.S. defense AI adoption, in particular, aligning these organizations could be game-changing. Addressing DoD’s siloed data, standardizing and improving its quality and access, is a precondition to having the data necessary to train algorithms for many defense uses, and any future technologies that rely on collecting, processing, and using information. Implementation will be critical and heavily dependent on two things. First, to catalyze AI adoption, the CDAO will need to develop close relationships with the military services and combatant commands. Second, the CDAO will need to coordinate with DoD’s research and development organizations, such as the Defense Innovation Unit, leading on AI experimentation and research. There is hard work ahead, but the new organizational design is promising. The office of the CDAO brings together previously independent components of DoD: the JAIC, the office of the Chief Data Officer, the Defense Digital Service (DDS), and the Office of Advancing Analytics (ADVANA). The office of the Chief Data Officer is in charge of data management and coordination, DDS finds digital solutions for internal data and security issues, and ADVANA aggregates data and conducts data analytics. The combination of these offices raised questions about whether an independent JAIC was necessary for U.S. defense AI leadership. Departing CDO Spirk says that the CDAO will be “taking the best parts of all the organizations it is overseeing and redistributing them for faster and better decision-making.” We agree. At present, not only is DoD’s data siloed but its AI efforts and initiatives are as well. According to the company Govini, in FY21, fifteen separate departments and organizations funded and worked on AI and AI-adjacent technologies, often without formal coordination or throughlines. This has led to redundancies, gaps, inconsistencies in application and access to data and resources, and an overall hodge-podge of AI efforts. DoD has acknowledged this and is making organizational changes necessary to accelerate AI adoption even more by restructuring its AI approach from the ground up. Now, CDAO will have teams working on policy and governance, technology development, and rolling out data and AI for the Pentagon and the military services, to avoid bureaucratic duplication and confusion that could undermine the CDAO’s overall authority. In particular, bringing the data and AI teams together will improve the data DoD needs for AI development. Some might fear that the reorganization of the JAIC’s functions within the CDAO means the United States is not as committed to the role of AI in the future of U.S. national defense. Based on current information, this concern is misplaced. First, the JAIC was created so the U.S. military could effectively take advantage of the way AI will shape the future of war. It succeeded in many ways. Recognition of the importance of AI for the future of U.S. defense, and national security in general, is much more widespread. The JAIC made headway on AI adoption and data literacy, with initiatives like “AI 101,” and on the data integration issue, as part of the Artificial Intelligence and Data Initiative (AIDA). The military services are investing more in AI and related technologies such as autonomous systems. This, ironically, makes an independent JAIC less necessary. Renewing America Ideas and initiatives for renewing America’s economic strength. Email Address View all newsletters > Second, the JAIC has also faced challenges that the CDAO approach can address. The JAIC had multiple missions, including advising DoD on AI adoption, funding AI research, and building AI tools itself. The JAIC also lacked the authority to advance military service adoption of AI on its own, or to itself transform the connection between AI and overall DoD policy and strategy. The JAIC ended up arguably not policy-focused enough to lead on policy, and not technically equipped enough to lead on algorithm development. While the JAIC encouraged AI investment within DoD, its existence also highlighted how the uncoordinated DoD AI portfolio required even more organization. The CDAO approach will address some of these issues by fusing DoD data and AI efforts, as will a growing focus on AI in other DoD components, from Research & Engineering on the technology development side to OSD-Policy (Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy) on the strategy and governance side. Third, it is difficult to get things immediately right when it comes to converting emerging technologies into adopted innovations, especially for conservative institutions like militaries. We think about experimentation as a critical part of how the technology invention process works, but the same is true when it comes to transforming organizations. Given the way data access and integration are essential to innovation, consolidating data and AI, rather than having a specific JAIC only focused on AI, will make technological adoption across DoD more likely. While it will hopefully spur AI forward within the department, subsuming the JAIC into the CDAO does come with some risks. Currently, there is a widespread understanding that AI is essential for U.S. success in strategic competition and defense leadership. However, we may be taking the prioritization of AI for granted, and future DoD leaders might have a different perspective even if the capabilities of AI tools continue to mature and advance. If that were to happen, the absence of an independent JAIC could lead to a withering of focus on AI, and a downplaying of its importance and relevance, just at the key moment advances in algorithms become more relevant for many military functions. Reward requires risk, especially when it comes to innovation with emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. Technology development is not a linear process and often involves failure along the way. Innovation becomes even more challenging when it requires organizational change to facilitate adoption. Saying goodbye to the JAIC will be bittersweet—the JAIC played a critical role in advancing the U.S. military’s emphasis on AI and set the table for what is next. Moving forward, however, bringing the JAIC into the CDAO will create a more integrated approach to AI and data that is likely to help the United States achieve defense AI leadership.

#### Counterplan can’t solve hybrid warfare - DoD key to harden capabilities and deter cyber attacks

Anderson et al. 16 (R. Reed Anderson, Patrick J. Ellis, Antonio M. Paz, Kyle A. Reed, Lendy “Alamo” Renegar and John T. Vaughan *“STRATEGIC LANDPOWER AND A RESURGENT RUSSIA: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO DETERRENCE*: Chapter 4 THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, May 1, 2016, pp. 117-142, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep12082.11>, WC)

Another challenge will be getting the right interagency trainers in the right country at the right time. With no overall decision-maker across the interagency other than the President, organizations will have to choose to contribute to the effort versus being compelled to contribute. In a resource-constrained environment, the ability of agencies to surge people forward will remain difficult. A potential DoD contribution in this area would be to leverage the unique capabilities and relationships that exist in the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP). Although it would not be a systemic fix, the National Guard frequently has citizen soldiers who have unique skills from their civilian life that would transfer over to assisting with FID efforts. Stereotypically, there are a high number of police officers in the Guard who would have the ability to train in civil disturbance response. Information technology professionals would also be invaluable assets in assisting the Allies with hardening their networks against Russian cyberattacks. Additional funding and authorities would be required to effectively pursue this course of action but, in the short term, the National Guard could assist with filling this gap. The relationships already built through years of the SPP would serve to enhance this type of training.

The United States must also take into account the nature of the threat and the operational environment facing each ally when it considers training and equipping efforts. Each ally will use their forces in a manner informed by culture, history, geopolitics, and other factors, which ideally should shape the scope and breadth of U.S. efforts. For example, FID activities could enable the Baltic States in their efforts to counter ambiguous threats ultimately emanating from Moscow, but U.S. planners must be cognizant of Baltic State sensitivities toward their Russian-speaking populations. A large amount of the recommended FID training is already taking place under EUCOM’s TSC efforts. What is currently lacking is a synchronized interagency effort that is focused on building national resiliency as a component of an overall country specific strategy.

### 2AC – DoD key – Funding

#### DoD is better – they have the budget flexibility key to solve

Epstein and Rosen 18 (Susan B. Epstein, Specialist in Foreign Policy. Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics,“U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends” Congressional Research Service,” Congressional Research Service, Feb. 1, 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov R45091, WC)

Moreover, funding data for security assistance and data on historical security assistance funding are incomplete. Although DOS has long been required to track most security assistance funding by aid account and on an individual country basis, DOD has not. As a result, comparisons between security assistance funding provided by both departments are challenging, and totaling the two may leave gaps.

The 115th Congress is continuing scrutiny and debate on security assistance matters. Within the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs FY2018 budget request, the Administration is seeking to reduce international security assistance by about $2.3 billion, or 24.4%. Each of the security assistance programs would be reduced by amounts ranging from 9% to more than 54%. In addition, the Administration proposes making changes to security assistance programs, such as designating 95% of the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program to four countries. The remaining 5% of the funds, rather than being made available on a grant basis globally as FMF is currently implemented, would be made available to all other countries with a combination of grant and loan assistance to be coordinated with DOD. Congress is also debating a possible increase of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds for defense and nondefense, including for funding security assistance activities in FY2018.5

Currently, there is no DOD budget request for security cooperation programs and activities that is comparable to the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs FY2018 budget request for State Department-managed security assistance accounts. Soon, however, this may change; Section 1249 of the FY2017 NDAA added a new section to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, requiring the President, beginning with the FY2019 budget, to submit a formal, consolidated budget request for all DOD’s security cooperation efforts, including the military departments and, as practicable, by country or region and by authority.

### 2AC – CP fails – Staffing

#### DoS is structurally flawed and can’t solve – lack of talent and funding

Zeya and Finer 20 (Uzra S. Zeya, CEO and president of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, a network of more than 130 organizations working in over 180 countries to end conflict through peaceful means. Jon Finer, adjunct senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” Council on Foreign Relations, No. 89, November 2020, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/csr89_final.pdf>, WC)

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests.

The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation.

The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

In an era in which the United States’ military and economic advantages over its nearest rivals are eroding and the more than $5 trillion spent in the U.S. war on terrorism since 9/11 has corresponded with a fivefold increase in global terrorist attacks annually, alliances and relationships with partners around the world are ever-important components of U.S. national power.1 In recent years, for a range of reasons, the United States’ international relationships have atrophied along with its diplomatic capacity to leverage them against the threats and opportunities it faces. The profoundly challenging moment at home— interrelated crises of public health, economic prosperity, and racial justice—is all the more reason to take stock of how to participate in the wider world, not turn away from it.

#### The DoS is ill-staffed to undergo a major AI crusade now

#### Buble 20 Courtney Buble, staff correspondent who covers federal management, oversight, contracting and regulations, “Watchdog Finds Serious Staffing and Leadership Problems at State Department”, JANUARY 23, 2020, https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2020/01/watchdog-finds-serious-staffing-and-leadership-problems-state-department/162621/

The State Department’s mission is compromised by “staff shortages, frequent turnover, poor leadership, and inexperienced and undertrained staff,” the department’s inspector general warned in a new report. “Workforce management issues are pervasive, affecting programs and operations domestically and overseas and across functional areas and geographic regions,” the watchdog [reported](https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/fy_2019_ig_statement_on_department_management_challenges.pdf) Wednesday. The [16-month hiring freeze](https://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2018/05/after-16-months-state-department-ends-hiring-freeze/148219/) imposed by the Trump administration in early 2017 continues to affect operations and morale, the IG found, noting that department officials anticipate it will take until 2021 to fully recover from its impact. All 38 bureaus and offices that responded to the IG’s survey and 97% of the embassies and consulates reported that the hiring freeze had either a somewhat negative or very negative effect on employee morale and welfare. “Employees told OIG that the hiring freeze contributed to excessive workloads, and the lack of transparency about the objectives intended to be achieved by the hiring freeze caused some to be concerned about losing their jobs,” the IG reported. Not all workforce problems can be attributed to the hiring freeze, however. The report cited challenges at the U.S. embassy in Nassau, Bahamas, stemming from senior leadership vacancies that date back years—the embassy has been without a permanent confirmed ambassador since November 2011. At the same embassy, the acting director of the Office of Foreign Mission was “overburdened and overwhelmed” from holding three positions and there was a disproportionate workload from the realignment of other personnel. In addition to staffing shortages, “under-qualified staff is an issue that frequently intersects with the department’s difficulties managing and overseeing contracts,” the IG said. For example, in Iraq, there was a lack of qualified employees to serve as contracting officer representatives and, in India, officers in charge of human rights and counterterrorism did not have the necessary training. In its response to the IG’s findings, State agreed that it is “critically important” to maintain adequate staffing levels and said the department has made significant progress: “Under Secretary Pompeo’s leadership, currently the department is just 1% shy of its goal to have over 13,000 Foreign Service employees by January 2020, with nearly 12,800 FS staff on board as of October 2019.” The department also aims to increase civil service hiring by about 7%, and is taking steps to improve retention and recruitment. Beyond staffing and training, the IG also cited a number of examples of poor leadership. At the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, which has 11 offices that carry out U.S. policy in the United Nations and other international organizations, the IG found allegations of political appointees disrespecting, retaliating against, and harassing career staff. Compounding the problems, leadership failed to address the issues. At the Libreville Embassy in Gabon, Africa, the problems were rife: a senior leader’s verbal outbursts rattled staff; supervisors failed to address poor performance; and the deputy chief of mission urged staff to find a job for his spouse, which possibly violated the anti-nepotism policy. “The department acknowledges that combatting a toxic workplace starts at the top; holding leadership accountable is key to maintaining a productive and mission-focused workplace,” State said in its response.

#### DoS lacks necessary personnel to engage in extensive foreign policy

Morello 17 Carol Morello, National reporter focusing on foreign policy and State Department, “State Department’s plan for staff cuts causing new worry in Congress”, November 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-departments-plan-for-staff-cuts-causing-new-worry-in-congress/2017/11/15/72576ac6-ca10-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d\_story.html

A growing, bipartisan number of lawmakers are expressing alarm over anticipated personnel cuts at the State Department, saying they have contributed to plummeting morale and will undermine diplomacy and foreign policy for years to come. In the latest example, Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) urged Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Wednesday to lift a hiring freeze and promote experienced Foreign Service officers, requesting in a letter more details about Tillerson’s reorganization plan. Citing reports of declining morale, recruitment and retention levels, the senators wrote that "America's diplomatic power is being weakened internally as complex, global crises are growing externally." Tillerson's management decisions, they say, "threaten to undermine the long-term health and effectiveness of American diplomacy." The letter reflects mounting concern on Capitol Hill and among foreign policy experts about the loss of experienced diplomats under the Trump administration. On Tuesday, the Republican and Democratic heads of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said the State Department’s cuts are endangering the nation. Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Md.) called the cuts a risk to national security and a “high-level decapitation of leadership.” “Folks, this situation is alarming,” Cardin said. “We put our country in danger.” [[Senators sharply question State Department budget cuts](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tillerson-argues-state-departments-main-focus-should-be-on-us-security/2017/06/13/0438ebdc-503f-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_story.html?utm_term=.43304fe2af4b)] The Office of Management and Budget has directed the State Department to slash its almost 76,000 employees by 8 percent. To meet that goal beyond normal attrition, the State Department is offering buyouts and early retirement incentives of $25,000 — before taxes — to the first 641 eligible people who sign up by April 30. The buyouts are being directed by the White House, not the seventh floor of the Harry S. Truman Building where Tillerson sits. Tillerson, who has proposed cutting almost 30 percent of his budget, has described his "redesign" of the State Department as his most important task. He has disputed accounts of low morale in Foggy Bottom, telling Bloomberg News recently, ["I'm not seeing it, I'm not getting it."](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-26/how-rex-tillerson-is-remaking-the-state-department) But anecdotes abound in the agency’s halls. Former ambassadors recalled to Washington feel humiliated about being assigned menial jobs such as reviewing Freedom of Information Act requests to clear a large backlog. Competition for overseas jobs has become fiercer as more young diplomats seek to escape the turmoil for the next few years. Many employees are still bristling over Trump’s assertion this month that while a number of key positions at the State Department still have no nominees to fill them, “I’m the only one that matters” in formulating foreign policy. Job opportunities also are shrinking at the U.S. Agency for International Development, which recently notified 97 applicants for overseas postings that the positions had been canceled, a tacit admission that the hiring freeze will be in place for a long time. [[USAID cancels jobs for dozens of applicants amid State Department hiring freeze](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/usaid-cancels-jobs-for-dozens-of-applicants-amid-state-department-hiring-freeze/2017/11/04/31c094c0-c0b9-11e7-959c-fe2b598d8c00_story.html?utm_term=.fe262a420522)] Nevertheless, State Department figures show that the number of employees remains about the same as it was when Tillerson took the reins in early February. Two-thirds of the 76,000 employees are locally employed in 276 missions around the world, leaving almost 14,000 Foreign Service officers and almost 11,000 civil service employees. Although the hiring freeze is still in effect, Tillerson has mitigated the impact by approving more than 2,300 exemptions to the freeze as of late October. Among the hires are about 300 new Foreign Service officers and almost 150 civil service employees. The numbers underscore a flight of experienced leadership. Barbara Stephenson, who heads the American Foreign Service Association union, wrote in a recent newsletter that senior leaders are departing at a “dizzying speed.” Among the figures she cited, three of the five career ambassadors, the highest rank for diplomats, have quit or retired since Tillerson took over. The number of career ministers, the next level down, also has decreased, from 33 to 19. The next-level ministers are down by 62 diplomats, to 369, just since Labor Day, “and are still falling,” she wrote. Stephenson also said that fewer Foreign Service officers are being recruited, and far fewer are taking the entrance exam, although State Department officials attribute this to an improving economy rather than a lack of interest. Stephenson thinks the damage will be felt for years. “The talent being shown the door now is not only our top talent but also talent that cannot be replicated overnight,” she wrote. This is not the first time the State Department has been hit with big staff cuts. Under President Bill Clinton, the department cut more than 2,000 employees, largely by shuttering the U.S. Information Agency, and closed consulates in 26 foreign cities. USAID, which runs foreign aid programs, closed 23 overseas missions. According to congressional aides who deal with State Department operations, the goal is again to reduce the ranks by 2,000 people, a proposed cut that has held steady since Trump came to office and before Tillerson took over. But the latest round of staff cuts is far less transparent than previous efforts, with almost no details provided to Congress, they say. “It’s being done behind the scenes,” said one aide, speaking on the condition of anonymity to offer frank insight about what they are hearing from State Department employees who don’t normally speak to Congress. “They dismiss the legitimacy of Foreign Service officers. They started working at breaking down morale from the get-go. There’s not a lot of trust there.” In their letter to Tillerson, Shaheen and McCain cited the union’s statistics to paint a picture of a State Department floundering. Shaheen sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and McCain heads the Senate Armed Services Committee. “Taken together,” they wrote, “questionable management practices at the Department of State; the attitudes of some in the Administration on the value of diplomacy; declining morale, recruitment and retention; the lack of experienced leadership to further the strength and longevity of our nation’s diplomatic corps; and reports of American diplomacy becoming less effective paint a disturbing picture.”

### 1AR – DoD key

#### CP takes too long and requires operation shifts

Bergmann and Schmitt 21 (Max Bergmann, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, focusing on European security and US-Russia relations. Alexandra Schmitt, Senior Policy Analyst, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” American Progress, MAR 9, 2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)

Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency.

#### DoD solves better – their author concedes status quo security assistance fails through the DoS

Bergmann and Schmitt 21 (Max Bergmann, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, focusing on European security and US-Russia relations. Alexandra Schmitt, Senior Policy Analyst, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” American Progress, MAR 9, 2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/,WC)

Congressional barriers exacerbated the DOD-State Department imbalance. The 2011 Budget Control Act and a Republican-controlled Congress skeptical of the State Department made giving more resources to the department a nonstarter.39 Senior DOD officials urged Congress to grant the agency new authorities, such as in a 2008 House Armed Services Committee hearing with the secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.40 Faced with these constraints, the Obama administration opted to create more authorities at the DOD through the annual must-pass National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees, with jurisdiction only over the State Department’s security assistance programs, did little to correct the imbalance.41 According to one study before the recent consolidation efforts, the DOD managed 48 out of 50 new programs created after the 9/11 attacks.42 Of the 107 existing security assistance programs today, the DOD manages 87—a whopping 81 percent.43

DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46